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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Counsel
Washington, D. C. 20505

25X1 [redacted]

29 November 1978

TO: Ms. Diane LaVoy
Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence

Dear Diane:

I am forwarding a copy of the <u>New York Times</u> article dated <u>19 November 1978</u> by Richard Burt, per your request. I am also forwarding excerpts from the article as well as a copy of "Notes from the Director" which I think you already received a copy of. I hope you will find that these three items will satisfy your concerns.

Sincerely,

25X1 [redacted]

Assistant Legislative Counsel

Enclosures

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Analysis

Burt: "Let's take Iran."

DCI: "This is the cross of intelligence. On this one you're the easy scapegoat--you can't defend yourself. You can't explain what you did say and what you didn't say. I'd like to have done better in the Iranian case. But even the Iranians were surprised. Clearly we were pointing out that there was trouble going on in Iran, there were riots, marshall law and all these kinds of things."

NIO for Warning

DCI: "I've set up an NIO for warning."

Burt: "For warning--"

DCI: "Yes, to put more emphasis on, and this is before Iran, by the way, before it became a crisis, but I wanted somebody to be sure we're looking for where things are going to bust out."

Burt: "Warning across the board."

DCI: "Warning across the board, not just is war going to break out. Where are there going to be problems that the United States has to grapple with--economic, political or military."

Notes from the Director

No. 3

11 October 1978

NIO FOR WARNING

One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the broader sense—warning of any development serious enough to concern the President and the National Security Council.

It is apparent that we need a stronger national structure for warning than that which now exists. I have therefore asked Dick Lehman to step aside from his position as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him a special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

In this capacity as NIO/Warning, he will be my senior staff officer for all warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency "Warning Working Group," and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level warning committee chaired by the DDCI. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. He will also be my "ombudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a serious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my name.

In the establishment of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will be asking many of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just another bureaucratic exercise; it is a serious effort to meet a critical requirement. The NIO/Warning will have my strong personal backing.

CHANNELS FOR DISSENT

The principal method for the expression of dissent within the Agency involves the various avenues available within each Directorate for challenging or testing analysis, policy and procedure. This is a process which must take place in a routine yet vigorous fashion if our products and activities are to be maintained at a level of high quality. The squelching of divergent views on significant issues can lead to intellectual stagnation and second-rate performance. It is important, therefore, that

THE NEW YORK TIMES
19 November 1979

The Nation

Except for Iran Reefs, Turner's C.I.A. Is at Last Coming About

By RICHARD BURT

WASHINGTON — Like the warships he used to command, Adm. Stansfield Turner has come through an arduous shakedown cruise as the Carter Administration's director of Central Intelligence. It is too early to suggest that he has returned safely to port, but his ability to stay afloat is no small accomplishment.

When he was appointed 17 months ago to head the Central Intelligence Agency, the former naval officer found himself with a troubled organization. Public confidence had been shaken by revelations of illegal activities at home and "dirty tricks" abroad while petty bureaucratic jealousies that had been allowed to fester for years undermined the agency's effectiveness. Admiral Turner talks confidently, as he did in an interview last week, about how under him the agency is on its way to winning back respect. His manner was characteristically blunt, but given recent events it may be hard to understand the self-assurance.

The agency has come under attack, especially from White House assistants who maintain that it should have predicted the turmoil that has swept Iran, and who complain that they still do not have adequate information on the Moslem fundamentalists who are challenging the power of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Less crucial perhaps, but still distracting, is the way Admiral Turner has been embroiled in disputes involving former agency employees.

One that could affect the agency's future dealings with former workers was the suit against Frank W. Snepp 3d, whose book, "Decent Interval," chronicled C.I.A. bungling in the United States evacuation of South Vietnam three years ago. Last week, William Kampiles, a former agency clerk, was found guilty of selling the Russians a manual on the KH-11 reconnaisance satellite. An expert on strategic arms, David S. Sullivan, was dismissed after he was suspected of passing secrets to an aide to Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, a hardliner on negotiations for a new arms treay with the Soviet Union.

These difficulties followed even rougher going in Admiral Turner's first few months, when it seemed that every step he took made matters worse. Morale, already battered, hit rock-bottom after he decided to dismiss 800 employees, many of them espionage operatives and senior staff members. Normally secretive agency officials suddenly began complaining to news reporters about the admiral's "aloofness," his style of management, which seemed cutthroat to them, and his apparent preference for the advice of former naval aides.

Other senior foreign policy officials were antagonized by Admiral Turner's eagerness to grab control of the Pentagon's intelligence services and by what some described as his desire to influence policy on such sensitive issues as the withdrawal of United States forces from South Korea. His obvious ambition and his close to President Carter, a former classmate at Annapolis, whom he sees at least once a week, even produced suggestions, both in and out of government, that a controversial agency study on world oil production had been tailored to support White House energy policies.

For all the complaints, though, there are reasons to believe that the worst is over for both Admiral Turner and his agency. Morale at the headquarters in Langley, Va. seems to have improved, in part, the director's aides say, because of efforts to get him to meet with staff members. He now tries to have lunch with members of various offices once or twice a week. Admiral Turner says he enjoys these "bull sessions," but in typical fashion declares, "I'm not about to start a glad-handing campaign just to make people feel better around here."

More important to morale, he insists, is a general easing that has taken place in the criticism directed at the agency. To him, "all the beating this place took in recent years was exactly the same that the military took after Vietnam."

It also helped that Frank Carlucci took over early this year as deputy director, handling the day-to-day management of the agency. Mr. Carlucci had done well in sensitive Government jobs, most recently as the United States Ambassador to Portugal, where he is said to have played a critical role in helping establish a democratic government in 1976. He possesses both the tact and personal insight that his boss is said to lack. Admiral Turner denies reports that he was forced to accept Mr. Carlucci, and in the interview acknowledged that his deputy had "taken a tremendous load off my shoulders."

Even if operations are smoother at Langley, the admiral remains a controversial figure within the Carter Administration at large. His relations with members of the White House staff are tense, and he is known to have locked horns frequentlyt with David Aaron, deputy to national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and a key intelligence aide. As a one-time staff member for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Aaron, as well as the Senator he had worked for, Walter F. Mondale, became a keen skeptic of the agency'scapability.

One main objection among some policymakers is that the agency persistently has failed to anticipate critical developments. The turmoil in Iran is cited as a prime example, and this purported failing, it is argued, has narrowed the policy opinions available to Mr. Carter.

Admiral Turner, however, replied last week that in most cases the agency had been made the fall guy for the mistakes of others. "We're an easy scapegoat," he said, "because if we miss one, we can't explain what happened." But in discussing the events in Iran, he conceded that "we would have liked to have done better," and disclosed that a new C.I.A. post for "warning," had been created to concentrate resources on future trouble spots.

On the delicate issue of his relations with President Carter, the admiral strongly rejected the notion that he often has tried to influence the outcome of policy debates. But he added that if asked for his opinion on a possible course of action, he is not afraid to speak his mind. "If somebody asks me what I think," he said, "like any red-blooded chap, I'm not going to sit on my hands."

Richard Burt is a reporter in the Washington bureau of The New York Times.